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CAN SUBSIDIARIES BE "PURCHASERS" FROM
THEIR PARENTS UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT? A PLEA FOR A
CONSISTENT APPROACH
Should a parent corporation be allowed to discriminate in favor of
its wholly-owned subsidiary? Courts have long grappled with this
question when interpreting section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act
(the "Act").' Section 2(a) prohibits price discrimination between "dif-
ferent purchasers." 2 If the subsidiary corporation is a "different pur-
chaser" when it purchases goods from its parent, then the parent
violates the Robinson-Patman Act by discriminating in the subsidi-
ary's favor.
Many courts, when faced with this issue, have ruled that the parent
and subsidiary are per se parts of a single entity. The Fifth Circuit was
the first court to adopt this per se approach, in Security Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Gates Rubber Co.' The analysis in Security Tire, however, is
flawed.' These flaws make the court's approach questionable. In
reviewing the "different purchaser" issue, this Comment compares
three closely related doctrines: The same seller doctrine, the indirect
purchaser doctrine, and the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Comparison of the per se approach to the "different purchaser" analy-
sis with the approach of the latter three doctrines will illustrate the
inherent flaws of the per se approach.
Proponents of the per se test adopted in Security Tire have put forth
a number of arguments to justify the test. The court in Security Tire
attempted to justify its holding by claiming that the price of goods
transferred between parent and subsidiary corporations has no eco-
nomic significance.5 In a later case, another court rationalized the per
se test by claiming that application of an alternative test would pro-
1. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat.
730, 730-31 (1914)).
2. The Act prohibits price discrimination only if such discrimination may substantially
reduce competition. Id.' Price discrimination is proven under Section 2 of the Act by showing
that the seller charged one purchaser a higher price for like goods than charged one of the
purchaser's competitors. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices § 154 (1971). The phrase "different purchasers" is contained in section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
3. 598 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979); see infra notes 20-22 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
5. Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 942 (1979).
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hibit parent corporations from providing services to its subsidiary.6
This Comment will show that these arguments do not put forth a valid
justification for the Security Tire per se test.
A better approach would be to replace Security Tire's per se test
with the "dominion and control" test used in applying other Robin-
son-Patman Act doctrines.7 Under this test a court would examine
the economic reality underlying the parent-subsidiary relationship.
This test should be adopted because it is consistent with other Robin-
son-Patman Act doctrines and it recognizes the significance of the
price given to goods transferred between parent and subsidiary corpo-
rations. A failure to adopt this test would perpetuate legal form over
economic substance.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Robinson-Patman Act
In the years following World War I, large retail store chains began
to act as wholesalers.8 These large chain stores were able to offer con-
sumers lower prices through operational efficiencies by integration and
their ability to demand price concessions from suppliers.' As a result
of lower prices, the market shares of the chain stores increased dra-
matically in the 1920's and 1930's.11 Chain stores increased their mar-
ket shares at the expense of independent retailers.1"
The Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, afforded some protection to
small retailers by prohibiting price discrimination.12 However, a
number of deficiencies in the Clayton Act allowed large chain stores to
circumvent the price discrimination prohibition. t3 In 1936, Congress
6. Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 220-21 (6th Cir.
1985) (2-1 decision).
7. The "dominion and control" test is used for both the same seller doctrine and the indirect
purchaser doctrine. A court applying the "dominion and control" test would review the actual
relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiary to determine whether the two
corporations are, in substance, one economic entity or two separate entities. See infra notes
71-78 and accompanying text.
8. C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 8-9 (1959).
9. 3 E. KINTNER & J. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 19.1 (1983).
10. See generally FTC FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, reprinted in
S. DoC. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-28, 53, 60 (1935).
11. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 12-13 (1955).
12. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730-31 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1982)).
13. For example, the Clayton Act permitted a seller to grant a purchaser a lower price if the
purchaser performed some cost saving service for the seller or if it purchased larger quantities.
The lower price granted to the purchaser, however, was not limited to the savings achieved by
the purchaser's service. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.), cert.
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moved to correct these deficiencies by enacting the Robinson-Patman
Act.
B. Origin of the Relevant Doctrines
Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act authorizes an action for
price discrimination upon a showing that the seller charged one pur-
chaser a higher price for like goods than that charged a "different pur-
chaser."14 Section 2 poses a number of issues concerning the
significance of transfers between parent and subsidiary corporations.
These issues have led to the emergence of three separate doctrines:
The different purchaser doctrine,15 the same seller doctrine, 6 and the
indirect purchaser doctrine.17 The same seller and indirect purchaser
doctrines are discussed in this Comment because they are often analo-
gized to the different purchaser doctrine. The intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine under the Sherman Act18 is also examined because it has
been frequently analogized to the different purchaser doctrine. This
denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939). A purchaser who bought goods in larger quantities could demand a
price break which represented more than the cost savings to the seller. Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, price differentials are limited to the actual amount of cost savings to the seller. See,
e.g., American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), modified, 190 F.2d 73
(5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
14. Section 2 of the Act provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce...." Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730-31 (1914)) (emphasis
added).
15. Section 2 prohibits price discrimination among "different purchasers." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1982). Courts have construed this to require at least two purchasers. Security Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 964 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979). Under
the different purchaser doctrine, a wholly-owned subsidiary which is a different entity is a
"purchaser." If the subsidiary is a "purchaser," Section 2 prevents the parent corporation from
favoring the subsidiary over other purchasers. Security Tire adopted a per se test that prevents
subsidiaries from being "purchasers" from their parent corporations. See infra notes 19-31 and
accompanying text.
16. Section 2 prohibits "any person" from engaging in price discrimination. 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1982). A plaintiff claiming price discrimination must show that he is an actual
purchaser from the person charged with the discrimination. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13,
15 (3d Cir. 1956). Under the same seller doctrine, sales from a wholly-owned subsidiary are sales
from the parent if the parent retains sufficient control over the goods transferred to the
subsidiary. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
17. Section 2 prohibits "indirect" price discrimination. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). Under the
indirect purchaser doctrine, sales by either an independent or wholly-owned intermediary
corporation will be considered sales by the original seller if the original seller retains substantial
control over the secondary sales price. The original seller must sell at the same price if the
"purchasers" compete at the same level. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
18. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade. Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
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Comment compares the analysis under these other doctrines to the
different purchaser analysis to show that it would be logical to adopt
the "dominion and control" test used in the same seller and indirect
purchaser doctrine.
C. Different Purchaser Doctrine
The different purchaser problem arises when a corporation transfers
goods to its subsidiary at a price below that available to others. An
entity transferring goods to itself neither sells nor purchases.19 Thus,
if a court determines that parent and subsidiary are the same entity,
the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply. However, if the court says
parent and subsidiary are different entities, then the subsidiary is a
"different purchaser." The parent will then be liable under the Robin-
son-Patman Act for granting its subsidiary a more favorable price
than the price charged to an unrelated purchaser.
The Fifth Circuit in Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber
Co.2" was the first court to rule that, as a matter of law, a subsidiary
cannot be a "different purchaser." Two other United States courts of
appeals followed the Security Tire holding.21 Under these holdings, a
parent corporation can never violate the Robinson-Patman Act by
selling to its wholly-owned subsidiary; Security Tire permits the parent
to freely discriminate between its subsidiary and other purchasers.22
Before Security Tire, a number of federal district courts in other
circuits developed different tests to determine whether subsidiary cor-
porations should be considered different entities, and hence "different
purchasers."23 The court in Danko v. Shell Oil Co.24 held that a sub-
sidiary buying from its parent is always a "different purchaser" under
the Act.25 The court found that the parent's dominion and control
19. A sale is "[a] contract between two parties .... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (5th
ed. 1979) (emphasis added); see also infra note 62.
20. 598 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
21. City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988); Russ' Kwik
Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1985) (2-1 decision). After
the Fifth Circuit's split, the newly created Eleventh Circuit adopted the precedent set in Security
Tire and other Fifth Circuit cases. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (1Ith Cir.
1981) (en banc).
22. Security Tire, 598 F.2d at 962; Russ' Kwik Car Wash, 772 F.2d at 214; City of Mt.
Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 268.
23. Brown v. Hansen Publications, Inc., 556 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1977); Reines Distribs., Inc.
v. Admiral Corp., 241 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886
(E.D.N.Y. 1953).
24. Danko, 115 F. Supp. at 888.
"25. Id.
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over its subsidiary was irrelevant to whether their relationship was
that of vendor and purchaser.26
The court in Snyder v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc.27
adopted an approach based on passage of title. In' Snyder, the court
held that if a parent transfers title to the goods to its subsidiary, the
subsidiary is a different purchaser.2"
Another alternative "different purchaser" test is the "dominion and
control" test, adopted in Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp.29
The "dominion and control" test focuses on who has dominion and
control over goods.30 If the parent retains dominion and control over
the goods, even though physically transferred to the subsidiary, the
subsidiary is not a purchaser. If the subsidiary obtains dominion and
control over the goods transferred to it, however, then the subsidiary
is a "purchaser" of the goods from its parent.
31
26. The court stated that the fact that defendant may own and control the plaintiff's
competitor "would not destroy the relationship of vendor and purchaser. In any event it is
doubtful that such relationship, if discriminatory, would be permitted to accomplish such
objective." Id. The opinion does not reveal whether the subsidiary in Danko was a legally
separate corporation. Consequently, a determination cannot be made whether the court intended
different purchaser status to be attached to a subsidiary which is not a legally separate
corporation. Either approach directly contradicts Security Tire.
27. 412 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ill. 1976).
28. In Snyder, the plaintiff brought a Robinson-Patman action against a defendant who
allegedly favored one of its divisions. No sale from one corporation to another occurred. The
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the favored transfer was
within the same corporation. The court held that "[flor there to be a sale, title must clearly be
transferred from seller to buyer." Id. at 731. The intra-corporate transfer in this case did not
result in a transfer of title.
This test precludes the finding of different purchasers when the transfer is from one division to
another division of the same corporation. No different purchaser exists in this situation because
title is not transferred.
29. 241 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Reines involved a motion by an allegedly disfavored
purchaser-plaintiff to declare a subsidiary of Admiral Corporation a purchaser under sections
2(a) and 2(e) of the Clayton Act. The court held that a question of fact existed as to whether the
subsidiary was a purchaser within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 815.
30. Id.
31. Id. Under the Reines decision, the parent corporation has dominion and control of goods
if the parent sets the pricing and distribution policies of its subsidiary. The Reines court relied on
Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), a same seller case. See
infra note 38.
In Brown v. Hansen Publications, Inc., 556 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1977), however, the court
examined the total relationship between the parent and subsidiary. Id. at 972. The court
determined that even though the subsidiary set its own pricing and distribution policies, the
parent and subsidiary were a single econo ic entity. Id. In Brown, rather than being parent and
subsidiary corporations, the stock of tlie two corporations was actually owned by a single
individual. Id. at 970. Both corporations used the same employees, office space, records; and
accounting and payroll systems. Id. at 971. For further analysis of the different aspects of the
"dominion and control" test, see infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
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D. Same Seller Doctrine
The different purchaser doctrine is often compared to the same
seller doctrine. The Robinson-Patman Act only prohibits price dis-
crimination by the same seller.32  A purchaser buying from a selling
corporation may be required to pay a different price than a different
purchaser buying from the selling corporation's subsidiary.33 If the
selling corporation and its subsidiary are the "same seller," they have
engaged in price discrimination prohibited by the Robinson-Patman
Act.
34
A court applying the same seller doctrine, like one applying the dif-
ferent purchaser doctrine, must determine whether a parent and its
subsidiary corporation are distinct entities for purposes of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. 5 Unlike the different purchaser doctrine, however,
under the same seller doctrine, courts unanimously hold that a parent
and subsidiary are the same seller if the parent exercises dominion and
control over the pricing and distribution policies of its subsidiary.36
32. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat.
730, 730-31 (1914)). See supra note 16.
33. For example, Parent corporation (P) sells a good to X for 20 cents. P's wholly-owned
Subsidiary (S) sells the same type of good to a different purchaser at 25 cents. Are P and S the
same seller under the Act?
34. 3 E. KINTNER & J. BAUER, supra note 9, at § 21.16.
35. In the different purchaser setting, a defendant will deny that the subsidiary and parent are
different economic entities. If the defendant is successful in this argument, the plaintiff will be
unsuccessful in claiming that the subsidiary is a "different purchaser." However, under the same
seller doctrine, a defendant will claim that the parent and subsidiary are different economic
entities. If the defendant is successful in this argument, the plaintiff will be unsuccessful in
claiming that the subsidiary's sales were actually sales made by the parent.
36. See, e.g., ACME Refrigeration, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 785 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 171 (1986); Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869, 870-71
(E.D. Wis. 1973); Baim & Blank Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541, 543-44 (E.D.N.Y.
1957).
The leading same seller case is Bairn & Blank 148 F. Supp. at 541. In Bairn & Blank, Baim
brought suit against Philco Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Philco Distributors,
Inc.. Baim alleged that the defendants had discriminated against Baim by selling to Baim's
competitor at prices lower than those prices charged to Baim. Id. at 542. In fact, Balm never
purchased goods directly from Philco, but had always dealt with Philco's subsidiary. Baim's
competitor had purchased goods directly from Philco. Philco and its subsidiary filed a motion
for summary judgment claiming that the sales alleged by Baim were not made by the same seller.
Baim responded by alleging, "Philco so dominated and regulated the policies of its wholly owned
subsidiary, Philco Distributors, that the subsidiary is merely an instrumentality or alter ego of its
parent ..... Id. at 543. The court granted the motion for summary judgment because both
Philco and Philco Distributors set their own prices independently. The court held this factor
decisive in concluding that Philco and its subsidiary were different sellers. Id. at 544.
962
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E. Indirect Purchaser Doctrine
The different purchaser doctrine is also compared to the indirect
purchaser doctrine. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price dis-
crimination among both direct and indirect purchasers. In an indirect
purchaser case, a court must determine whether a purchaser of goods
through an intermediary3 7 is really a purchaser from the original
seller.38 Courts will determine that an ultimate purchaser of goods
through an intermediary has "purchased" goods from the original
seller if the original seller retains sufficient control over the intermedi-
ary's sales to the ultimate purchaser. 9 Courts thus apply the same
37. Note the distinction between the same seller and indirect purchaser doctrines. In the
same seller context, the plaintiff purchases from a wholly-owned subsidiary. In the indirect
purchaser doctrine, the plaintiff purchases from an intermediary which is probably not owned by
the original selling corporation. Further, under the same seller doctrine, the goods which the
plaintiff purchases may originate with the subsidiary rather than the parent who is accused of
discrimination. Under the indirect purchaser doctrine, the goods which the plaintiff purchases
originate with the corporation accused of discrimination.
Unlike the different purchaser doctrine, the indirect purchaser doctrine typically involves an
independent wholesaler rather than a wholly-owned subsidiary. See, eg., FTC v. Fred Meyer,
Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
In discussing the indirect purchaser doctrine, the court in Security Tire stated, "[i]f there is an
affirmative showing that the parent actively controls a wholly-owned sales subsidiary, then the
subsidiary's sales are attributable to the parent." Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber
Co., 598 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
Apparently, the court in Security Tire was confused on. this point. Under the indirect
purchaser doctrine, ownership of the controlled corporation is not necessarily the controlling
factor in determining whether two economically distinct entities exist.
But cf Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969). In this case, Standard Oil sold its
products to Signal Oil and Gas Company at a lower price than it sold to Perkins. Signal sold
these products to Western Hyway, who in turn sold to Regal Stations. Signal owned 60% of
Western Hyway who in turn owned 55% of Regal. Regal competed with Perkins.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision to extend liability to Standard Oil.
In doing so, the Court noted that if Signal had sold directly to Regal, there would be no doubt
that the Robinson-Patman Act had been violated. Ia at 647-48. The Court went on to state
that it found "no basis in the language or purpose of the Act for immunizing Standard's price
discriminations simply because the product in question passed through an additional formal
exchange before reaching the level of Perkins' actual competitor." Id at 648.
38. For example, Manufacturer (M) sells goods to Retailer at 20 cents and sells the same
goods to Wholesaler (W) at 20 cents. W then sells these goods to Indirect Purchaser (X), a
retailer, for 25 cents. Is X a "purchaser" from M under the Robinson-Patman Act even though it
did not buy directly from M?
39. The indirect purchaser issue was first raised in In re Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25
F.T.C. 537 (1937). The manufacturer, Kraft, published a price list with quantity discounts to be
used by wholesalers. The Federal Trade Commission concluded that retailers buying from these
wholesalers were "purchasers" from Kraft under the Robinson-Patman Act even though title
was not transferred directly from Kraft to the retailers. The commission stated that "[a] retailer
is none the less a purchaser because he buys indirectly if, as here, the manufacturer deals with
him directly in promoting the sale of his products and exercises control over the terms upon
which he buys." Id. at 546. The manufacturer's control over resale terms has consistently been
the test in deciding whether the indirect purchaser was a considered a "purchaser" under the
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"dominion and control" test used under the different purchaser and
same seller doctrines. As in applying the different purchaser doctrine,
a court applying the indirect purchaser doctrine must determine
whether two economically affiliated corporations should be treated as
distinct entities for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act.
F Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine
Like the Robinson-Patman Act's same seller and indirect purchaser
doctrines, the Sherman Act's intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine also
provides insight into the different purchaser problem." The Sherman
Act prohibits concerted activity in restraint of trade.41 In an intra-
enterprise conspiracy case, the court must determine whether different
corporations with common ownership, such as a parent and its subsid-
iary, can "conspire" with each other.4' If a court characterizes two
corporations as a single entity, they cannot conspire.43  Because a
court must determine whether two corporations are one or two entities
for the purpose of applying the Sherman Act, the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine is analogous to the different purchaser, same seller,
and indirect purchaser doctrines.
In a number of early cases, the Supreme Court held that legally
separate corporations with common ownership were capable of con-
spiring with each other.' The Supreme Court recently overruled
these decisions in Copperweld Corp. V. Independence Tube Corp.4" A
majority of the Court held that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidi-
ary "are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of
the Sherman Act."4 6 The majority reasoned that affiliated corpora-
tions will always have the "unity of purpose" which section 1 of the
Act. Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d 74, 84 (6th Cir. 1981); Purolator Prods.,
Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 880 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
40. Both Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 221 (6th Cir.
1985) and Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886, 888 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) considered the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine a useful analogy in resolving the different purchaser problem.
41. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ...." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
42. Conspiracy is a "combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for the
purpose of cqmmitting, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act .. " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 280 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
43. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
44. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951),
overruled, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947).
45. 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
46. Id.
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Sherman Act seeks to prohibit.47 The majority also feared that corpo-
rations would be deterred from forming legally distinct subsidiaries.4 8
The majority reasoned that the parent should not be penalized for the
decision to incorporate subsidiaries because separate incorporation
may serve many legitimate interests.49 In dissent, Justice Stevens
argued that under the old rule, affiliated corporations would not be
liable for mere commonness of goals unless their actions were unrea-
sonable restraints of trade.5 0
II. EVALUATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE TESTS
Courts have developed three distinct methods in these related areas
of law to determine whether economically affiliated corporations are
different entities.5" The Danko test always treats legally separate cor-
porations as different entities.52 The Security Tire per se test always
treats legally separate corporations that have common ownership as
the same entity.53 The "dominion and control" test examines whether
one legally separate corporation has dominion and control over the
other.54
47. Id. at 771.
48. Id. at 773.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. A test which finds economically distinct entities within a single corporation could also be
used. Such a test, however, directly contradicts legislative history. See infra note 60 and
accompanying text. Therefore this test will not be considered here.
The transfer of title test used in Snyder is not considered separately in this Comment. See
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. This test, however, is incorporated in the "dominion
and control" test. Under the "dominion and control" test, separate entities cannot be found
unless there is legal transfer of title. This is a threshold requirement that must be reached before
determining whether the two legally separate corporations are two distinct economic entities.
Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp, 241 F. Supp. 814, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
52. The court in Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886, 888 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), advocated
this test in the different purchaser context. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
53. Under the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, courts always treat economically affiliated
corporations as a single entity, incapable of conspiring with itself. Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752.
The courts in Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979), and Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co.,
772 F.2d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1985) adopted this test for use with the different purchaser problem.
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
54. Under both the same seller and indirect purchaser doctrines, courts uniformly treat
legally separate corporations as economically distinct entities only when no dominion and
control exist. Economically affiliated corporations under these doctrines are considered a single
economic entity when one corporation controls the pricing and distribution policy of the other
corporation. ACME Refrigeration, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 785 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1986);
Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1981); Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC,
352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965); Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Bairn & Blank Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); In re Kraft-Phenix
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Which test is appropriate in the different purchaser context? The
recent trend has been toward adopting the Security Tire per se test.55
The Security Tire per se test is consistent with the position taken by
courts in recent years limiting the application of the Robinson-Patman
Act.5 6 This test is inconsistent, however, with the test used in the
same seller and indirect purchaser context.5 7
A. Legislative History of the Act
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act provides some
guidance in resolving the different purchaser issue. Two relevant facts
appear in the legislative history of the 1936 Act. First, the drafter of
the Robinson-Patman Act 58 was concerned with the harmful effects
that all discriminatory sales have on competition. 9 Second, the
drafter did not intend the Act to apply to transfers within a single
corporation.6
Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). The court in Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 241 F.
Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), adopted this test for use with different purchaser problems. See
supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
55. City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988); Russ'
Kwik Car Wash, 772 F.2d 214; Security Tire, 598 F.2d 962.
56. 3 E. KINTNER & J. BAUER, supra note 9, at § 31.21.
57. See supra notes 36 & 39 and accompanying text.
58. Mr. H. B. Teegarden drafted the Robinson-Patman Act. Mr. Teegarden was counsel for
the United States Wholesale Grocers Association. F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE ROBINSON- PATMAN ACT 11-12 n.38 (1962).
59. Mr. Lloyd ..... There are gas companies which are engaged in interstate commerce
and who probably would be reached under this act, who make it a practice and follow this
line of procedure substantially. They put in their usual lease contract a provision that
controls the retailer. They fix his price. His prices must be so much and no more over what
they sell to him.
Mr. Lloyd. Then they will put their own concern in, to which they make no sale, because it
is their own concern, and under your theory they would not be reached. They put that in
operation next door to him and undersell him by a cent a gallon less than he can under his
contract sell to the consuming public. That is one of their usual methods and that is one of
the most vicious practices that I know of.
Mr. Teegarden. Undoubtedly it is a vicious practice. Mr. Lloyd. I am for a bill that would
reach that sort of thing. It seems to me, if you would give some little thought to that-.....
Mr. Teegarden. I agree that it is a vicious practice. I do not believe this bill would reach it,
and offhand I doubt if it would be possible to reach it in this type of legislation.
To Amend the Clayton Act, 1935: Hearings on H.R. 8442, H.R. 4995, Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 229 (1935) [hereinafter To Amend the
Clayton Act] (statements of Mr. Lloyd and H.B. Teegarden, author of the Patman Bill) (emphasis
added).
60. Mr. Lloyd ... It is a common practice in my country for large concerns to buy at
wholesale and maintain large stocks and, at the same time, maintain a retail department. In
fact, their retail department is not segregated at allfrom their general business. But the small
retailer comes in there and buys from them at "wholesale prices", so-called. Manifestly, the
price charged by that concern to the independent retailer contemplates a profit, and is
greater than the price that it charges itself for its own retail business. How will this bill
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Congress was concerned with the practice of large vertically inte-
grated corporations discriminating against independents in favor of
their own retailing divisions." The Act does not apply in such situa-
tions only because those sorts of transfers are legally not sales.62 Con-
gress did make the Act applicable in other cases; for example, when a
parent corporation sells to a separately incorporated and economically
distinct enterprise. Recent courts have refused to interpret the Act in
conformity with the congressional purpose.6 3
B. Substance or Form?
Both sides of the different purchaser issue agree that economic sub-
stance should prevail over legal form.64 This Comment will use three
examples to illuminate the dichotomy between economic substance
and legal form.
In the first example, a manufacturing company forms an intra-cor-
porate retailing division. The same management controls both divi-
sions. The manufacturer transfers goods to its retailing division at a
lower price65 than it sells similar goods to unrelated purchasers. Both
the manufacturer and the retailer are the same entity under the law
and the retailing division is not, therefore, a "different purchaser. '66
Consequently, the Act does not apply.
affect that situation where this concern sells to itself for less than it sells to the independent
retailer?
After Mr. Lloyd clarified a misunderstanding of Mr. Teegarden, Mr. Teegarden responded:
Mr. Teegarden. There would be no question of discrimination presented as between itself
and an independent retailer.
Mr. Lloyd. I wonder why.
Mr. Teegarden. Because it is not a sale to itself. This only covers discrimination in sales.
Consequently, unless there is a sale on both sides, there can be no discrimination.
To Amend the Clayton Act, supra note 59, at 211 (statement of Mr. Lloyd and H.B. Teegarden,
author of the Patman Bill) (emphasis added).
61. See supra note 59.
62. A sale requires two parties. BLAcK's LAW DicTboNARY 1200 (5th ed. 1979).
Although a separately incorporated subsidiary meets the technical definition of "different
purchaser," to apply the Act when the subsidiary is not an economically distinct entity from its
parent would be to advance legal form over economic substance. Further, to apply the Act when
the subsidiary is not an economically distinct entity would not prevent the parent from granting
subsidies to the subsidiary in other forms. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
63. See, eg., Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
64. See, eg., Security Tire 598 F.2d at 967; Brown v. Hansen Publications, Inc., 556 F.2d 969,
971-72 (9th Cir. 1977).
65. In this context, "price" means the amount the accounting department charged the
retailing division.
66. A purchase is the "[t]ransmission of property from one person to another.... ." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (5th ed. 1979). A purchaser, therefore, must be one who buys from
another.
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Even though the Act does not apply to the retail division because of
its legal form, price discrimination may still cause economic injury to
competition. As a result of receiving a lower wholesale price, the
retailing division can offer a lower retail price and increase its market
share at the expense of an unrelated purchaser. Loss of market share
to an intra-corporate division injures competitors just as much as loss
to an unrelated independent corporation. The statute, however, as a
matter of congressional intent, does not provide a remedy to injury
caused by an intra-corporate division.67
As a second example, the manufacturer, for business purposes,
incorporates the retailing division as a legally separate corporation.
The manufacturer exercises the same amount of control over the
retailing subsidiary as exercised over the division in the prior example.
The manufacturer transfers goods to its retailing subsidiary at a lower
price than it transfers similar goods to unrelated purchasers.
In this example, the economic injury to the unrelated purchaser
remains the same. The manufacturer's control over the retailer has
not changed. In substance, the retailer is still part of one economic
entity with the parent. It is not a different purchaser.
The legal form in this example is, however, completely different.
The Act technically applies here because a legally distinct entity or
"different purchaser" has been accorded preferential treatment. 68 Yet
to apply the Robinson-Patman Act where the parent completely con-
trols the subsidiary, only because it is separately incorporated, is to
choose legal form over economic substance.
Courts should not apply the Robinson-Patman Act when legal form
is the only basis for the Act's application. Applying the Act to this
example would prevent corporations from forming legally separate
corporations. Corporations may have many valid business reasons for
forming legally separate corporations rather than divisions. 69 The law
should promote valid business practices when these practices do not
conflict with congressional intent. In the second example, treating
these two corporations as one legal entity would follow the economic
substance of the congressional legislation without sacrificing the policy
of allowing separate incorporation. To apply the Robinson-Patman
Act to penalize a corporation for an otherwise useful change of legal
form is manifestly wrong.
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 62.
69. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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As a third example, the manufacturer separately incorporates a
retail division but, unlike the first two examples, the manufacturer
retains no dominion and control over the retailer. The manufacturer
transfers goods to the retailing corporation at a lower price than it
transfers similar goods to unrelated purchasers.
In this case the economic substance as well as the legal form has
changed. The legal form differs from the first example because the
manufacturer, through incorporation, has created a separate legal
entity.70 The economic substance differs because the retailing corpora-
tion is also an economically distinct entity from the parent. In sub-
stance, the retailer is a different purchaser.
Security Tire's per se test assumes that the economic substance
underlying the last two examples is the same. The "dominion and
control" test, however, focuses a court's attention on whether the two
corporations are, in substance, two economically distinct entities. The
"dominion and control" test is the better alternative because it looks
to economic substance rather than legal form.
C. Clarifying.Dominion and Control
The "dominion and control" test is the proper test to determine
whether a separately incorporated subsidiary is a different purchaser
for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act. However, the test needs to
be clarified. In determining what constitutes "dominion and control,"
courts have looked to different economic factors. Some focus on con-
trol over pricing policy.71 Others look to the entire relationship
between the two corporations.72
The court in Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp.73 asserted
that pricing policy is essential in determining whether a parent corpo-
ration exercises economic dominion and control over its subsidiary.
The court based this assertion on the same seller doctrine.74 The same
seller doctrine is intended to prevent a parent corporation from incor-
porating a subsidiary to sell at a discriminatory price to a disfavored
or favored class of purchasers.75 The subsidiary is therefore held to be
the "same seller" as the parent if the parent sets the pricing and distri-
bution policies of the subsidiary. Determining who sets the pricing
70. A corporation is a legal entity. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (5th ed. 1979).
71. Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 241 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
72. Brown v. Hansen Publications, Inc., 556 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. 241 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
74. Ia at 815.
75. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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and distribution policy, therefore, is fundamental when applying the
same seller doctrine.
The different purchaser doctrine, however, is intended to prevent a
parent corporation from selling at a favored price to its subsidiary
when the subsidiary is a distinct economic entity.76 Dealings between
the parent and subsidiary are as meaningful to this determination as
the parent's control over dealings between the subsidiary and the ulti-
mate purchaser.
Brown v. Hansen Publications, Inc. 7 adopted the better approach by
examining the entire relationship between the parent and subsidiary.
All factors in the relationship are important in determining whether,
in substance, the parent and subsidiary are a single economic entity.
The Brown approach includes investigation into whether both corpo-
rations share employees, officers, office space, and record keeping
systems.7 8
Of course, control of the subsidiary's pricing policy is one factor in
the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. A court
employing the "dominion and control" test in the different purchaser
context needs to review control of the subsidiary's pricing policy along
with the many other factors affecting the relationship between parent
and subsidiary. In the different purchaser context, however, control of
pricing policy should not be emphasized as strongly as in those cases
involving the same seller doctrine.
D. Substance, Form, and Security Tire
Although the "dominion and control" test previously analyzed
advanced economic substance over legal form,79 the court in Security
Tire argued to the contrary. The court in Security Tire adopted a per
se rule that wholly-owned subsidiaries are never different purchasers
under the Robinson-Patman Act. The court posited that the veil of
separate incorporation was merely legal form.80 The court also stated
that the fact that a subsidiary is wholly owned by its parent indicates
76. Brown v. Hansen Publications, Inc., 556 F.2d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 1977).
77. 556 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1977).
78. Id. at 971-72.
79. Except, of course, when a division is a distinct economic entity. In this situation, the
language of the statute and the clear congressional intent prevent courts from looking to the
economic substance of the relationship. A division cannot be a "different purchaser." See supra
note 60.
80. Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
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that the economic substance of the structure is a single economic unit
manufacturing and marketing its product.81
The Security Tire court, however, erred in this conclusion because
economic substance is determined by more than corporate ownership.
The "dominion and control" test goes beyond the mere legal form of
separate incorporation. The "dominion and control" test addresses
the actual relationship between the parent and subsidiary. A court
applying the "dominion and control" test reviews the factual setting
and inner workings of the parent and subsidiary to determine if the
substance of the structure is actually that of a single economic unit
manufacturing and marketing its product. The "dominion and con-
trol" test, therefore, considers both economic substance and legal
form.
E. Reasoning By Analogy and Security Tire
The most obvious error in the Security Tire analysis is its use of
analogies. Reasoning by analogy is often used in legal analysis82 in
order to take advantage of prior analysis in related areas of the law.
This also provides for consistency across related areas of law. This
consistency results in a certain predictability which allows the public
to plan its business efficiently within the legal parameters.
To reason by analogy one must identify related areas of law.83 The
next step is to identify the tests used to resolve the issues in those
areas. 84 If related areas of law use different tests, then one must iden-
tify which related area is closest to the area of law in controversy.
8 5
The best test is the one that arises from the area of law most analo-
gous 86 to the area of law at issue.
87
Three areas of law related to the different purchaser doctrine are the
same seller, indirect purchaser and intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trines. Courts applying the same seller and indirect purchaser doc-
81. Id.
82. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949). Levi uses the term
"example" rather than "analogy," but he refers to the same mode of analysis.
83. Id. at 2. Levi refers to similarity in cases. Similarity in cases generally means that similar
areas of law are being analogized. When cases in similar areas of law are compared, the cases are
also similar.
84. Id
85. Or, more precisely, which area of law contains key similarities to the area of law at issue.
Id. at 3.
86. To determine the most analogous area of law, one must look to the source of the law and
the policy reasons that created the law.
87. This theory is sustained only if the tests used in those related areas of law are logical. A
bad test, consistently applied, is 'not preferable to an inconsistent test. This is an inherent
limitation in reasoning by analogy.
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trines use the "dominion and control" test. This test examines the
actual economic relationship to determine whether a parent and sub-
sidiary are a single economic entity. Conversely, courts applying the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine use a per se rule that assumes par-
ent corporations and their wholly-owned subsidiaries are always single
economic entities. Because the related areas of law use different tests,
a decision must be made as to which is most closely related to the
different purchaser doctrine.
Unlike the same seller and indirect purchaser doctrines, which
interpret the Robinson-Patman Act, the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine interprets the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act is intended to
prevent concerted activity which restrains trade.88 The intra-enter-
prise conspiracy doctrine is properly a per se rule because corporations
with common ownership cannot have the divergent interest that the
Sherman Act attempts to foster.89 This reasoning, however, does not
apply to the different purchaser doctrine under the Robinson-Patman
Act because the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits the anticompetitive
activity of a single actorf 0 Because the same seller and indirect pur-
chaser doctrines arise under the Robinson-Patman Act, they serve as
more useful analogies to the different purchaser doctrine.
The court in Security Tire agreed that the different purchaser doc-
trine was much closer in relationship to the same seller and indirect
purchaser doctrines than to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Comparing the two doctrines, the court in Security Tire stated that the
88. See supra note 41.
89. Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 222 (6th Cir.
1985) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. Russ' Kwik Car Wash, 772 F.2d at 222. The Copperweld Court adopted a per se test for
intra-enterprise conspiracy problems because the previously applied single entity test failed to
distinguish between concerted and independent activity. Russ' Kwik Car Wash, 772 F.2d at 222.
The Copperweld Court noted that Congress treated concerted behavior much more strictly
because of the anti-competitive risk inherent in concerted activity. Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984). Concerted behavior "deprives the
marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and
demands." Id. at 769. The Court noted, however, that in the parent-subsidiary situation both the
parent corporation and the subsidiary begin with common interests. No bringing together of
independent centers of decisionmaking occurs in a parent-subsidiary conspiracy case because the
parent corporation and subsidiary are already together. Id. at 771. Therefore, preventing the
parent corporation and subsidiary from acting in their similar interests is unwarranted. Id. at
771.
Judge Kennedy argued that, by contrast, liability under the Robinson-Patman Act is "not
limited to concerted activity. A single seller violates § 2(a) by charging one purchaser a higher
price than that charged the purchaser's competitor." Russ' Kwik Car Wash, 772 F.2d at 222.
Judge Kennedy also noted that, for Robinson-Patman Act purposes, the competitive relationship
between the purchasers is more important than the relationship between seller and purchaser.
Id.
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intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine involves "the rather remote ques-
tion whether a partially-owned subsidiary corporation could conspire
with its parent corporation in violation of the Sherman Act." 91
At this point, though, the court faltered. The court, although pur-
porting to use analogous doctrines, adopted a test entirely different
from that uniformly applied in the two analogous areas of law.92 Rea-
soning by analogy should result in conformity of applicable tests in the
most analogous areas of law. Although correct in ascertaining the
close relationship between these two doctrines and the different pur-
chaser doctrine, the court mistakenly concluded that the same seller
and indirect purchaser doctrines supported its holding.93
The court correctly stated that under the same seller doctrine, if
"there is an affirmative showing that the parent actively controls a
wholly-owned sales subsidiary, then the subsidiary's sales are attribu-
table to the parent."94 However, the court then illogically concluded
that since application of the same seller doctrine may result in a find-
ing of one economic entity, this supports the rule that a finding of a
single entity is mandated in the different purchaser context.95
The same seller doctrine does not employ a per se test.9 6 Rather
than offering support for the per se rule adopted in Security Tire, the
same seller analogy suggests that a subsidiary is a different purchaser if
the parent does not actively control the wholly-owned subsidiary. If
an affirmative showing of parent control renders a parent and subsidi-
ary the same seller under the Robinson-Patman Act, conversely, an
affirmative showing that no such control exists should render the sub-
sidiary an economically distinct entity and therefore a different
purchaser.
F. Discrimination in the Provision of Other Services
A subsequent court has attempted to justify Security Tire's per se
test on the grounds that a different result would mean that the Robin-
91. Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 965 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
Admittedly, this decision occurred prior to the judgment in Copperweld which changed the
test used in intra-enterprise conspiracy problems to one analogous to the test used by the court in
Security Tire. However, the manner in which the doctrine applies to resolve issues does not effect
how analogous the doctrine is to other doctrines.
92. Security Tire, 598 F.2d at 966.
93. Id. The court went on to explain the same seller doctrine and noted that the same test is
applied to determine whether a remote purchaser is an indirect purchaser.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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son-Patman Act prohibits a parent from providing special services to
its subsidiary.9" Section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act does pro-
hibit discrimination in the provision of services.98 Yet parent corpora-
tions typically provide accounting services, key personnel, and capital
to their subsidiary corporations. Indeed, a parent corporation could
not avoid providing special services to its subsidiary.99 A prohibition
of such activities would severely disrupt business.
Security Tire's per se test cannot be justified on this ground, how-
ever, because such services are not connected with the sale of trans-
ferred goods and, therefore, are not within the ambit of the statute. 1oo
Section 2(e) prohibits only discrimination in services "connected with
the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of" the goods in
question. 101
I. M. Skinner v. U.S. Steel Corp.l10 illustrates how the Act is
restricted to only those services connected with sales. In . M. Skin-
ner, the defendant manufacturer supplied a wholly-owned subsidiary
retail store. The defendant, at the request of its employees, deducted
employee purchases made at the subsidiary retail store from the
employees' paychecks."3 A retail competitor of the store alleged that
97. Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 220-21 (6th Cir.
1985).
98. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
Section 2(e) of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another
purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by
contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or
facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such
commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal
terms.
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730,
730-31 (1914)).
99. Russ' Kwik Car Wash, 772 F.2d at 220-21. The court in Russ' Kwik Car Wash stated
that:
It is impossible for parent corporations to avoid giving special benefits to their subsidiaries.
Here parent Marathon paid the salary of Emro's president. Parent corporations without
exception provide capital for their subsidiaries. The price at which the product is
transferred from parent to subsidiary may be only a small part of what is contributed by the
parent to the subsidiary and to the subsidiary's ability to compete.
Id. at 220-21.
100. I. M. Skinner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e); Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 617 F.2d 468 (7th Cir.
1980); Cecil Corley Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Tenn. 1974);
Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959); see also FTC Guides
for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240.5.
(1987).
102. 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956).
103. Id. at 763.
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the defendant failed to provide the plaintiff the same service as the
defendant provided to its wholly-owned subsidiary. The court held
that Section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act was not intended to
apply to all services, but only to those services connected with the
processing, handling, or sale of the good transferred.'0 4 The court
ruled in favor of the parent corporation because the payroll deductions
were not connected with the processing, handling, or sale of the goods
transferred.105 Similarly, services which parent corporations typically
pr6vide their subsidiaries, such as accounting and key personnel,
would not be prohibited by Section 2(e).106
G. Economic Significance of the Transfer Price
The court in Security Tire tried to justify its per se holding on the
grounds that the transfer price between the parent and subsidiary cor-
poration has no economic significance.10 7 Because this nonmarket
transaction cannot be meaningfully compared to a market transaction,
a court cannot determine whether price discrimination has occurred.
Therefore, parent transfers to subsidiaries should be per se exempt
from the Robinson-Patman Act. 108
If the parent and subsidiary corporation are part of one economic
entity, this analysis is correct. Even if the parent transfers goods to
the subsidiary at the same price at which it sells goods to the subsidi-
ary's competitors, the subsidiary could still sell goods at or below the
transfer price and cause the same injury to the subsidiary's competi-
tor. 0 9 The parent could loan money to the subsidiary or buy more
stock in the subsidiary to allow the subsidiary to continue functioning
without profit.
104. Id. at 765.
105. Id at 765-66.
106. Despite the Skinner decision, a parent corporation which discriminates in favor of a
subsidiary by providing some services not accorded other purchasers is not necessarily exempt
from liability under § 2(e). Services which would violate § 2(e) include provision of advertising,
handbills, window and floor displays, demonstrators and demonstrations, catalogs, and accepting
returns for credit. See FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising
Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240.5. (1987). The services which concerned the majority in
Russ' Kwik Car Wash, such as providing corporate officers, accounting services, and capital,
however, are not within the scope of § 2(e). See supra note 99.
107. Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962,967 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
108. Birrell, The Integrated Company and the Price Squeeze Under the Sherman Act and
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as Amended, 32 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 5, 24-30 (1956).
109. Alternatively, it may be argued that it is not harmful for the manufacturer to sell at this
low price. However, a disfavored purchaser in this situation is injured in the same manner and
magnitude as when the favored purchaser is an unrelated corporation. 3 E. KINrNER & J.
BAUER, supra note 9, at § 21.15.
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In this situation, the subsidiary does not have the independence to
maximize subsidiary profits. 10° It is useless, therefore, to regulate the
transfer price when the parent and subsidiary function as a single eco-
nomic entity. In this situation, the transfer price is not economically
significant.
If the subsidiary functions as an economically distinct entity,"1
however, the subsidiary would likely set its own pricing policy and
would be unlikely to adopt a pricing policy which causes it to suffer a
loss.' 12 The price at which the parent corporation transfers goods to
its subsidiary has economic significance in this case. The transfer price
facilitates the low retail price to the subsidiary which causes the injury
to the subsidiary's competitor.
When the parent and subsidiary are, in substance, a single economic
entity, the subsidiary's competitor will still be injured. This injury,
however, is in the nature of competition with a larger adversary rather
than a favored purchaser. When the parent and subsidiary are, in sub-
stance, different economic entities, the "dominion and control" test
would prevent the injury from occurring. The injury prevented is that
injury intended to be prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act. There-
fore, the "dominion and control" test should be adopted.
III. CONCLUSION
Three United States courts of appeals have ruled that a plaintiff has
no remedy under the Robinson-Patman Act for injury from price dis-
crimination when the favored purchaser is a subsidiary of the discrimi-
nating seller. These courts assume that a parent corporation and its
subsidiary are always a single economic entity. Because the subsidiary
does not have the status of a different entity, it cannot meet the statu-
tory requirement of being a different purchaser.
110. The subsidiary could be subject to Sherman II liability for predatory pricing if it had a
very large share of the market. See infra note 112.
11. If the subsidiary does not function as an economically distinct entity, the result of
applying the "dominion and control" test and the Security Tire test are the same. Transfers
between the parent and subsidiary would not be considered sales. Therefore, no cause of action
would exist.
112. Management of the subsidiary corporation would attempt to maximize profits for the
subsidiary even if such a policy did not optimize long run profits for the entire family of
corporations. Additionally, if the subsidiary sold below its purchase price, this would clearly be
predatory. If the subsidiary had a large enough market share, a plaintiff would have a clear cause
of action against the subsidiary under Sherman II for monopolization or attempting to
monopolize. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See Annotation, Price Cutting--Sherman Act,
52 A.L.R. FED. 728 (1981); see also 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair
Trade Practices § 105 (1971).
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This approach is in conflict with other Robinson-Patman Act doc-
trines. Both the Robinson-Patman Act's same seller and indirect pur-
chaser doctrines use the "dominion and control" test. The "dominion
and control" test examines the actual economic relationship to deter-
mine if the subsidiary is a different purchaser for purposes of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Only the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
considers two legally separate corporations to be a single entity under
any circumstances. This doctrine arises under the Sherman Act which
makes concerted activity in restraint of trade illegal. Conversely, the
Robinson-Patman Act prohibits the anticompetitive behavior of a sin-
gle entity.
The per se approach adopted by these courts is also inconsistent
with congressional intent. By promulgating the Robinson-Patman
Act, Congress intended to offer a remedy for competitive injury that
results from giving a price advantage to one firm over another. Price
discrimination in favor of a subsidiary results in competitive injury to
the subsidiary's competitor because of the comparative price disadvan-
tage. Study of the Robinson-Patman Act itself indicates that applica-
tion of the Act to parent corporations with no dominion and control
over their subsidiaries would fulfill the congressional intent.
Economic substance should prevail over legal form. The "dominion
and control" test, as defined in this Comment, examines the actual
relationship between parent and subsidiary corporations to determine
if they are, in substance, one economic entity or two. Courts should
study the entire relationship between parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions in order to decide whether the subsidiary is a different purchaser
under the Robinson-Patman Act. This "dominion andcontrol" test
would best assure that economic substance would prevail over legal
form.
John Huddleston
